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Introduction
There is considerable evidence that labor’s share of GDP has been decreasing since the 1980s (Bentolila and Saint-
Paul, 2003; Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2010; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). Reasons for the labor share
decline include market regulations (Azmat et al., 2012), globalization (Elsby et al., 2013), measurement issues
(Koh et al., 2018), technological change (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012), and market concentration (Autor et al.,
2017a). Over time, there has also been an increasing recognition of the importance of identifying the drivers of
the capital share (see Piketty and Zucman, 2014), in order to understand the overall allocation of income among
factor inputs. However, in most analyses, capital’s share is based on the residual between nominal value added
and payments to labor input. This implies that the capital share can include excess rents (Autor et al., 2017b,
Barkai, 2016), the mis-allocation of the labor income of the self-employed or, of most importance from the per-
spective of this paper, returns to unmeasured intangible capital.
Relatedly, most of the discussion on the decline of the labor share has considered a single capital asset, which
can either substitute or complement labor. One of the main arguments is that advances in communication tech-
nologies have reduced the price of capital while simultaneously increasing the degree to which capital can substi-
tute workers’ tasks, leading to more capital-intensive productions (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). In contrast,
Lawrence (2015) claims that rapid labor augmenting technical change has led to a decline of the effective capital
labor ratio, and given the complementarity between capital and labor, has decreased the labor share. Both ap-
proaches ignore the possibility that capital and labor can be substitutes or complements depending on the asset
type. In this paper we address the issue of capital heterogeneity and provide new evidence on its role in driving
movements in the labor share.
To guide our empirical analysis, we first develop a theoretical (multi-sector) framework where variation in the
aggregate labor share is explained by the elasticity of substitution of different types of capital assets (within ef-
fect) and changes in the economy’s structure (between effect) induced by the increase in the capital-to-income ra-
tio. Our set-up distinguishes between different types of workers as technology and capital heterogeneity are likely
to affect the labor share in different ways, depending on the skill level.
We then assess empirically the predictions of the model by performing a two-fold regression analysis using a
large industry dataset for OECD countries. First, we carry out a long-run analysis covering the 1970-2007 period.
To account for capital heterogeneity, we rely on a division into ICT and non-ICT capital, and then include the
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traditional measure of intangible capital, R&D capital stock. Our estimation procedure fully exploits the longitu-
dinal and time-series variation of the data, by estimating an Error Correction Model (ECM) and controlling for
heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence (Eberhardt et al., 2013). This dynamic specification has been shown
to produce consistent estimates even in the presence of simultaneity, when the lag structure of the variables is cor-
rectly specified (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). In addition, the inclusion of controls for cross-sectional dependence can
reasonably account for omitted variable bias.
Second, we focus on the determinants of the labor share for a relatively shorter period (1995-2007) using new
data on intangible assets, (Niebel et al., 2016), based on the pioneering approach of Corrado et al. (2005, and
2009). Intangibles include R&D and other innovative activities, overall termed innovative property investment,
and economic competencies which cover investments in organizational changes, workforce training and brand
development. As shown in numerous earlier studies, the latter type of intangible investments are necessary to
benefit from the adoption of new technologies (see Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004; Black and Lynch, 2001; Bresna-
han et al., 2002). Given that the new dataset is only available for a short period, our estimation relies on a static
fixed-effects framework and on an identification strategy to address endogeneity issues. Our instruments are based
on indicators of services markets regulation, under the assumption that firms’ decisions to invest in specific capital
types depends on the regulatory setting underlying the functioning of input markets. Examples include the reg-
ulation of telecommunications services and of architectural and engineering professional services as developed in
Koske et al. (2015).
Our results show that, while exogenous technical change always contributes to the decline of the labor share,
the different types of capital assets drive the labor share in different directions. In the long run estimates, ICT
capital plays a major role in driving the decline in the labor share, but with heterogeneous impacts, particularly
across industries. For example, ICT is a more important explanatory factor in electronic equipment manufactur-
ing and less so in services such as hotels and catering. The impact of ICT differs over different types of workers,
with a negative effect only on the wage bill share of the low and intermediate skilled. This is consistent with ear-
lier results on skill biased technical change (Autor et al., 1998). In contrast, R&D appears to raise the labor share
as these activities create rents that are likely shared by all workers (Aghion et al., 2017). Overall, our dynamic
specification predicts a 14.9% fall in the labor share, since the the 1970s, compared to an 11.1% observed in the
data. Using new estimates of intangible capital, in the second part of our analysis, we find that economic com-
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petencies, together with ICT, have the strongest negative impact, accounting for 21% and 19% (respectively) of
the decline in the labor share. Economic competencies are the components of intangibles that mostly complement
investment in ICT. The negative effect is again confined to low and intermediate skilled workers. Conversely, the
labor shares of the highly skilled are particularly immune to exogenous technical change, ICT and economic com-
petencies. Finally, the second main component of intangible assets, innovative properties, has a mostly positive
impact on the labor share, consistent with the results from the long-run dynamic specification. Overall, our study
concludes that the type of capital assets matters and accounting for capital heterogeneity is crucial to understand
movements in the labor share.
The present paper contributes to several important streams of the literature. We contribute to the debate on
the drivers of the labor share dynamics stressing how this pattern is affected by the firms’ increasing investments
in new capital types. Specifically, our work extends the analysis by Koh et al. (2018) to a cross-country, cross-
industry setting, showing that intangibles explain an important part of changes in the labor share. However, their
effect varies with the nature of the investment (innovative properties vs economic competencies) and in relation
to the complementarity between these assets and other inputs (ICT capital and skilled labor). Our work also ex-
tends the analysis of intangible capital to the distribution of factor returns and income inequality, a topic that has
remained largely unexplored in this recent literature, which has instead focused on measurement issues, produc-
tivity effects and spillovers of intangibles (Corrado et al., 2017). The model we develop also offers some insights
on the role of capital deepening on structural change. In fact, we show that the capital-output ratio affects not
only industries’ labor share but also the relative importance of each sector in the economy. This issue has been pi-
oneered by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) but has been recently re-assessed by Liu (2012) and Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2018) for its implications for the labor share dynamics in the light of capital-labor substitution.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section I briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section II
sets out the theoretical framework. Section III discusses our empirical specification, the data set used for the es-
timation of the ECM and presents our first set of results. Section IV presents the the analysis using the extended
forms of intangible assets and assesses their impact on the decline of the labor share. Finally, Section V concludes
the paper.
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I Background
The decline of the labor share is global (Dao et al., 2017) and has been documented for developed countries (O’Mahony
et al., 2019, Fukao and Perugini, 2018), European transition countries (Rincon-Aznar et al., 2015) and emerging
economies (Luo and Zhang, 2010; Bai and Qian, 2010). Understanding what drives this decline has been the sub-
ject of much analysis by economists in recent years. Earlier studies focused on the role of product and labor mar-
ket reforms, following the adoption of liberalisation and privatisation programmes in many OECD countries in
an attempt to increase productivity. Findings in relation to the labor share differ across studies. While increas-
ing competition is generally associated with increasing labor shares (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012), Azmat et al.
(2012) show that the privatisation of network services is associated with a reduction in the labor share, as the
focus of managers shifts away from employment targets and towards profitability targets. In the labor market,
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a model where the decline of the labor share is a short-run phenomenon
led by a decrease in the bargaining power of unions. However, their model predicts that the labor share increases
in the long-run, due to the interaction between product and labor market regulations, although no such increase
is apparent in the data. Recent evidence shows that labor market reforms aimed at weakening labor protection
are positively correlated with the labor share’s decline (Ciminelli et al., 2018), whilst policies promoting workers’
reallocation are likely to increase the labor share (Pak and Schwellnus, 2019).
Theoretically, assessing the impact of market regulations is complex because different types of policies may
be interdependent and interactions between labor and product market regulations need to be carefully modelled
(Fiori et al., 2012). Empirically, institutional settings do not present large variation over time and hence their
impact tends to be captured by the idiosyncratic component of empirical models, such as country- and/or time-
specific fixed effects. Therefore, the impacts of regulations on the labor share remains unknown. However, the
downward trend of the labor share appears to be very persistent, with little difference across countries with vary-
ing institutional arrangements (O’Mahony et al., 2019). This suggests that institutions may not be primarily re-
sponsible for the decline in the labor share.
A popular explanation in the earlier literature was that globalisation has moved job opportunities to low wage
countries leading to a downward pressure on wages in advanced economies. Elsby et al. (2013) provide empirical
support for this hypothesis as they find a strong association between the decline of the labor share and increased
import competition in the US. Conversely, results in Haskel et al. (2012) show that US wages are not strongly re-
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lated to US imports from emerging economies, which weakens the prediction of a negative relationship between
globalisation and the labor share. Similarly, Autor et al. (2017a) document that the decline of the labor share
has been observed in both traded and non-traded goods sectors, implying that the impact of trade is not as rel-
evant as others have argued. Young and Tackett (2018) extend this analysis by considering social and political
globalisation next to the standard measures of trade flows. Their results show that, while economic globalisation
is negatively associated with the labor share, promoting greater movement of individuals, ideas and information
contribute to its increase. However, the size of the estimated effects are rather small and not always significant.
The role of technological change has also received prominent support in the literature. Recent technologies
have increasingly led to more capital-intensive production. This trend has been facilitated by a decrease in the
price of capital goods, leading to higher substitution of labor by capital (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Karabar-
bounis and Neiman, 2014). Investments in ICT, automation and artificial intelligence are gradually replacing rou-
tine tasks previously performed by workers (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2016, and 2017), changing the structure of
the workplace and further reducing the demand for workers, particularly those with low skills. In addition, vom
Lehn (2018) documents that, in the US, the decline in the labor share has spread to high skilled occupations char-
acterized by significant amounts of routine work, especially in the post-2000s.
Technical change may have also contributed to the decline of the labor share by a more subtle channel, as the
adoption and diffusion of digital technologies has strengthened network effects, facilitating the rise of highly con-
centrated ’superstar’ firms. Autor et al. (2017b) cite evidence that the decline in the labor share is not apparent
within firms but only between firms. The focus on market power and rising profits is supported by empirical ev-
idence in Dixon and Lim (2018) and in Barkai (2016) who highlights the decline in both the labor share and the
capital share, while a larger amount of output is being distributed as profits. However, additional ’profits’ might
also represent returns to unmeasured inputs, in particular intangible assets, which are likely to be large in the so
called ’superstar’ firms. In turn, some intangible assets, such as those related to brand development, can reinforce
the trend towards more concentrated firms and raise profits.
A related research effort focuses on the measurement of factor inputs and their corresponding labor share. For
instance, Koh et al. (2018) claim that capitalisation of intellectual property products (IPP) in national accounts
may help to explain a large portion of the labor share’s decline in the United States. Cho et al. (2017) contend
that the fall in the labor share is due to increased capital depreciation, and the share of labor in net national in-
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come shows little decline. Del Rio and Lores (2019) argue that a decline in capital efficiency and a fall in capital
relative prices are the major factors responsible for the downward trend in the US labor share.
Both the literature on market power and on defining capital input have brought to the fore the need to focus
on capital’s share in its own right rather than just looking at labor’s share. However, the definition of capital used
in many studies generally refers to a total capital measure, without accounting for the possibility that different
types of assets can drive the labor share in opposing directions, as some may substitute, and others may comple-
ment workers. Heterogeneous capital is central to research on the determinants of productivity, with earlier work
concentrating on ICT and recent papers on intangible assets.1 Less is known about how heterogeneous capital
affects the labor share. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this issue.
II Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a baseline set-up which we use as guidance in the interpretation of the econometric re-
sults. Let us consider a static, multi-sector economy with aggregate output, Y , defined as Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) combination of industry outputs.
There are two sectors in this economy, denoted by subscripts I and N (i = I,N), combining capital assets and
labor inputs of different types, Ki and Li. We could think of one sector as high tech (I), using, for example, inno-
vative capital (ICT or intangible assets) and high skilled labor, and the other sector as low tech using traditional
capital (non-ICT or tangible assets) and low skilled labor (N). Aggregate output is (time subscript omitted for
simplicity):
Y = [φIY
−
I + φNY
−
N ]
− 1 (1)
φi is a distribution parameter with 0 < φi < 1 and
∑
i φi = 1, whilst  is a substitution parameter between goods
( > −∞). The elasticity of substitution is defined as ϑ = 1/(1 + ). These goods are gross substitutes if ϑ > 1
(or  < 0) and complements if ϑ < 1 (or  > 0). Assuming perfectly competitive markets, the (relative) demand of
each intermediate good is
Yi
Y
= φ
1
1+
i
(Pi
P
)− 11+ (2)
in which Pi is the industry output price and P is the price of aggregate output.
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Each sector produces with a CES technology with factor-specific technical change (AL > 0 and AK > 0):
Yi = [αi(ALiLi)
−σi + (1− αi)(AKiKi)−σi ]−
1
σi (3)
where Yi is real output, Li is the number of employees, Ki the capital stock. ηi = 1/(1 + σi) is the elasticity of
substitution between factors used in each production, and σi is the corresponding substitution parameter. In each
sector, the labor share of output is defined as the proportion of value added accruing to workers, SLi =
WiLi
piYi
,
where Wi is the wage rate. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale (0 < αi < 1), the industry labor
share can be derived from the capital share on income, SLi = 1− SKi = 1− (RiKi/piYi), where Ri is the user cost
of industry capital. If we define the capital-to-output ratio in a given industry as k˜i = Ki/Yi, the labor share of
industry output can be expressed as
SLi = 1− (1− αi)(AKik˜i)−σii︸ ︷︷ ︸
SKi
(4)
Therefore, it is easy to show that an increase in the capital-to-output ratio, k˜i, generates a change in S
L
i depend-
ing on the substitution parameter between capital and labor at industry level (σi):
∂SLi
∂k˜i
= σi(1− αi)A−σiKi k˜−σi−1. (5)
If factor inputs are gross substitutes at industry level(σi < 0 or equivalently ηi > 1) then we have
∂SLi
∂k˜i
< 0 , whilst
if they are gross complements then
∂SLi
∂k˜i
> 0 (σi > 0 or ηi < 1).
At the aggregate level, the labor share is a weighted average of industry labor shares, in which the industry
shares are defined as the ratio between the value of industry and total output, θi = PiYi/(
∑
i PiYi):
SL =
∑
iWiLi
PY
= SLI θI + S
L
NθN . (6)
As a consequence, when an industry increases its capital-output ratio the effect on the economy-wide labor share
is a combination of two effects, within and between (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014):2
∂SL
∂k˜I
=
∂SLI
∂k˜I
θI︸ ︷︷ ︸
within−effect
+
∂θI
∂k˜I
(SLI − SLN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
between−effect
. (7)
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The former is a first-order effect reflecting the change of the industry labor share, SLI , and is proportional to the
relative size of the industry, θI (within effect). The latter is a second-order effect and captures the structural
change induced by the increase in the capital-output ratio, i.e. the re-allocation of the economy’s resources to-
wards (or away from) industries with a lower (or higher) labor share (see Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008). This
effect reflects the change in the industry relative size and the gap in the sectoral labor shares (between effect).
The within-effect is negligible when the industry share on GDP, θI , tends to zero, whilst the between-effect is ir-
relevant when the labor share is equal among sectors.
Figure 1: Industry labor share and output weights: Innovative vs Traditional industries (un-weighted mean)
.4
.6
.8
1970 1980 1990 2000 20101970 1980 1990 2000 2010
INNOVATIVE (knowledge intensive) TRADITIONAL (no knowledge intensive)
Output weight (θi) Labour share (SiL)
Notes: Output weight (θi) is the ratio between the industry group value added and total value added. Labor share (S
L
i ) is the ratio
between labor compensation and value added at industry level. Innovative industries (cat. ISIC Rev. 3): 24, 30t33, 34t35, 60t63, 64, 65t67,
71t74. Traditional industries: 15t16, 17t19, 20, 21t22, 36t37, 40t41, 45 50t52, 55, 90t93. Country list: Austria (AT); Australia (AUS);
Belgium (BE); Czech Republic (CZ); Denmark (DK); France (FR); Finland (FI); Germany (DE); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Italy (IT);
Japan (JP); Netherlands (NL); Spain (ES); Sweden (SE); United Kingdom (UK); United States (US).
To gain insights on the sectoral sources of the labor share dynamics at an aggregate level, Figure 1 plots the
evolution of the labor share and the share of industry output on GDP for innovative (knowledge intensive) and
traditional (non-knowledge intensive) sectors, for our sample of OECD countries (see Sections III.1 and IV for
details).3 The group of innovative industries includes high-tech manufacturing sectors and knowledge intensive
services, whilst the group of traditional industries collects all remaining sectors (Eurostat classification). Figure 1
shows that innovative industries are more capital intensive and have a lower labor share compared to traditional
sectors (SLI −SLN < 0). Furthermore, the GDP share of innovative industries is increasing over time (primarily due
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to the expansion of high-tech services).
Based on this evidence, we characterize how the aggregate labor share should change as a result of capital
deepening in the light of our model’s predictions (see Table 1). As eqs. (5) and (7) show, the within-effect varies
with the factor elasticity of substitution: if factors are complements (substitutes) σi > 0 (σi < 0), the within-effect
is positive (negative). Conversely, the between-effect depends on the sign and size of the substitution and distri-
bution parameters (, φI). To show this, we re-formulate the industry share, θI , as a function of the real output
ratio by exploiting the inverse of eq. (2):
θI =
PI
P
× YI
Y
= φI ×
(YI
Y
)−
. (8)
The response of θI to an increase in k˜I is positive when  < 0. When  > 0, ∂θI/∂k˜I is positive only if the
real output ratio YI/Y is lower than the threshold φ
1/; otherwise the partial derivative is negative. In economic
terms, these findings can be rationalised as follows. When goods are substitutes ( < 0 – CASE B.1) or weak
complements ( > 0 but with low values – CASE B.2), θI increases with k˜I . This occurs as the expansion of YI
crowds out YN (i.e. when  < 0) or as, when both productions expand, the increase in YI dominates that in YN
since the relative price of the former good increases (i.e. when  > 0 with low values). This manifests when the
real output ratio YI/Y is relatively low, i.e. below the threshold φ
1/
I . Conversely, when goods are strong com-
plements ( > 0 with large values – CASE B.3), the increase in YI is accompanied by a rise in the relative price,
reducing the share of the sector in GDP. This occurs when YI/Y is relatively high, i.e. above the threshold φ
1/
I .
4
Summing up, our model shows that the impact of capital deepening on the aggregate labor share is ambigu-
ous as it depends on the combination of the within- and the between-effect. However, at the industry level, the
effect of an increase in the capital-output ratio is less ambiguous as it strictly reflects the degree of factors’ substi-
tutability. The model therefore allows for the possibility that some capital inputs may substitute and others may
complement labor.
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Table 1: Aggregate labor share and sectoral capital-to-output ratio: comparative statics
A- Within Effect
σI subject to: ∂S
L
I /∂k˜I
A.1 > 0 always > 0
A.2 > 0 always < 0
B- Between Effect
 subject to: ∂θI/∂k˜I
B.1 < 0 always > 0
B.2 > 0 YI/Y < φ
1/
I
> 0
B.3 > 0 YI/Y > φ
1/
I
< 0
III The long-run impact of technology and capital
III.1 Empirical specification and data
In the empirical analysis, we estimate a stochastic version of the industry labor share (eq. 4), expressed in logs,
using panel data for an industry-by-country sample:
lnSLijt = α0ij + α1ij lnAijt + α2 ln k˜ijt + ijt (9)
where A is capital-specific technical change and k˜ is the capital-output ratio, where output is measured by indus-
try value added. Subscript i denotes industries and j countries, α0ij are industry-country fixed effects and ijt is a
spherical error term. If labor and capital are gross substitutes the coefficient of capital intensity is expected to be
negative (α2 < 0), and positive if factor inputs are complement (α2 > 0). A is not observable but can be proxied
by TFP, implying that the sign of this parameter should follow that of the capital-to-output ratio (Bassanini and
Manfredi, 2012).5
The coefficients of eq. (9) represent long-run elasticities. Empirically, these can be identified by rewriting a
dynamic version of the labor share equation using an autoregressive distributed lag process, ARDL(p,q) which
here, for notational simplicity, is formulated with a lag order of one:
lnSL,ijt = β0ij + β1ij lnSL,ijt−1 + β2ij lnAijt + β3ij lnAijt−1 + β4ij ln k˜ijt + β5ij ln k˜ijt−1 + ijt (10)
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This can be reformulated as an error correction mechanism (ECM), as follows:
∆ lnSL,ijt = γ0ij + γ1ij∆ lnAijt + γ2ij∆ ln k˜ijt + γ3ij lnSL,ijt−1 + γ4ij lnAijt−1 + γ5ij ln k˜ijt−1 + ijt (11)
Equation (11) represents our benchmark specification and can be used to estimate long-run effects. For instance,
for capital intensity, the long-run parameter is defined as: α2ij = −γ5/γ3, whose significance is checked using the
non-linear test of the delta method. The coefficient γ3 indicates the speed at which the economy returns to its
long-run equilibrium. Inference on this parameter will provide insights into the presence of a long-run equilibrium
relationship. Equation (11) is then extended by including different types of capital assets, starting with the dis-
tinction between ICT and non-ICT capital and further expanding our specification to account for the impact of
knowledge capital.
We estimate equation (11) using data from the EU KLEMS dataset (release 2009). This data set covers sev-
enteen OECD countries and twenty market industries (12 manufacturing and 8 service industries), spanning from
1970 to 2007.6 The exclusion of the latest years after the financial turmoil allows us to isolate the long-run impact
of technological factors from the effect of the crisis. The EU KLEMS dataset provides information on industry
accounts (labor compensation, value added, capital stocks with a division into ICT and non-ICT components)
and derived variables such as TFP.7 Levels of TFP are measured in relative terms, with values for US industries
in 1997 as numeraire. Capital measures are obtained using the perpetual inventory method and geometric de-
preciation. All monetary variables are made comparable using the relative PPP of industry output (1997 base),
following Inklaar and Timmer (2008). We proxy knowledge capital using the cumulative value of R&D expenses
(source: OECD ANBERD 2002 and 2006). Similar to the other capital assets, we express knowledge capital rel-
ative to real value added. Knowledge capital is built by means of the perpetual inventory method assuming an
annual geometrical depreciation rate of 15%. R&D expenses are expressed at constant prices and converted into
an industry base of PPP (base year=1997). The value of capital stock at the initial year is computed with the
formula devised by Hall and Mairesse (1995). Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 present summary statistics at the
country and industry level.
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Table 2: Capital-labor substitutions and technology impact on labor shares (long-run coefficients)
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
coefficients AMG coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP -0.187*** -0.395*** -0.457*** -0.372***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.053) (0.061)
Total capital/value added -0.010 -0.070**
(0.023) (0.028)
Non-ICT capital/value added -0.022 -0.003
(0.049) (0.062)
ICT capital/value added -0.037*** -0.045***
(0.007) (0.012)
Knowledge capital/value added 0.052**
(0.021)
ECM -0.134*** -0.515*** -0.632*** -0.750***
(0.005) (0.020) (0.023) (0.03˚a0)
Obs 8620 8620 8620 5348
Groups 340 340 340 207
Notes: Dependent variable is the labor share over value added. Standard errors obtained with the delta method in parentheses. Columns
(1) reports results for an ECM model with homogeneous parameters. Columns (2) -(4) are Augmented mean group estimates based on
control for strong cross-sectional dependence (Eberhardt and Bond, 2018). ECM is the error correction mechanism parameter (γ3 in eq.
13). *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. The reduction in the number of observations is column (4) is due to missing
observations for R&D, especially for services sectors.
III.2 Baseline results
Table 2 presents the results for our baseline specification, reporting estimates for the long-run coefficients and the
error correction term, assuming a one year lag structure, ARDL(1,1,1). Results for a richer dynamic specification,
ARDL(2,2,2), are presented in Appendix Table A.3. In the first column of Table 2, we present estimates based
on a fixed effect estimator, where coefficients are imposed to be common for all cross-sectional units (industry-by-
country) in our data. In Columns (2) and (3) we relax this assumption and present estimates based on an aug-
mented mean group estimator (Eberhardt and Bond, 2018). This procedure estimates the specification separately
for each panel unit, controlling for the presence of cross-sectional dependence through heterogeneous factor load-
ings (not shown here for the sake of brevity). The advantage of using this estimator, compared to standard fixed
effects, is that it can better account for heterogeneity across industries in the effect of the explanatory variables
and control for cross-sectional dependence caused by common unknown factors, such as a global shock, technologi-
cal spillovers, etc. (Eberhardt et al., 2013).
Results in Table 2 reveal that the impact of TFP is always negative and statistically significant, in line with
earlier studies (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Given that these are long-run
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coefficients, they represent the trend impact of TFP, and can be considered as a proxy for exogenous technical
progress. The negative impact of technology is larger when we relax the assumption of homogeneous coefficients
(columns 2 and 3). Our results confirm the presence of capital-labor substitution, as the coefficient estimate for
the total capital to value added ratio is negatively signed, and significant when we allow for heterogeneous coeffi-
cients. These results suggest that there is large heterogeneity across industries in the effect of technology and the
capital-output ratio and failing to account for this issue may lead to severely biased estimates. The error correc-
tion term has the expected sign and it is always statistically significant, supporting our modelling framework.
In column (3) we extend our model to account for different types of capital assets, starting with the distinc-
tion between ICT and non-ICT capital. These results show that the capital-labor substitution is driven by ICT
capital only, while non-ICT capital is not statistically significant. The latter implies, from a theoretical viewpoint,
an elasticity of substitution between non-ICT capital and labor equal to one, i.e. the substitution effect exactly
compensates the price effect, as discussed in Bassanini and Manfredi (2012). Conversely, the ICT capital-output
ratio has a negative and significant effect on the labor share. ICT capital assets have spread massively over the
last twenty years due to a drastic fall in relative prices, substituting many occupational tasks particularly at the
intermediate skill level (Michaels et al., 2014). A more recent literature has shown that the fast diffusion of ICT
and the proliferation of information-intensive goods, software platform and online services, has created the condi-
tions for high industry concentration (Autor et al., 2017b), which has been linked to declining labor (and capital)
shares (Barkai, 2016). This provides further support for the negative impact of ICT. In unreported robustness
checks, we have also included relative prices of ICT assets but this variable turns out to be insignificant, leaving
unchanged our main results. This implies that the impact of ICT is not only due to the fall in their relative prices
as suggested in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
In column (4) we extend our baseline specification by adding an additional form of capital asset: knowledge
capital. When we introduce knowledge capital we look at the impact of technology in more detail and we are able
to distinguish between exogenous technology (as captured by TFP) and the source of endogenous technological
change, measured by the industry’ own decision to invest in innovation. Knowledge-generating activities increase
the degree of firm competitiveness and, therefore, are unlikely to adversely influence labor share dynamics. In-
deed, technologically advanced industries are characterized by a more dynamic demand, suffer less cost-cutting
pressure and have larger rents to share with workers (Aghion et al., 2017). Also, more innovative firms employ
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Figure 2: Long-run coefficient estimates of ICT capital/value added, by industry and country (baseline estimates)
(A) (B)
Note: Darker bars denote that long-run coefficients are statistically significant.
higher skilled or highly educated workers to manage processes of technology production, adaptation and imple-
mentation (Mason et al., 2019). From this perspective, knowledge capital may work differently from those assets
considered previously, ICT and non-ICT capital. The introduction of knowledge capital does not change our con-
clusions for ICT and non-ICT capital and TFP; however, and consistent with our expectations, the relationship
between this asset type and the labor share is profoundly different as knowledge capital contributes to an increase
of the labor share. This suggests that investments in innovative activities complement, rather than substitute,
labor.
We now investigate the role of ICT and TFP in driving the decline of the labor share, by re-estimating the
specification in column 3 for each industry and each country. Figure 2 presents the long-run coefficient estimates
for the ICT intensity variable, for individual industries (panel A) and countries (panel B). The length of the bars
identifies the size of the impact, while the darker colour indicates statistical significance. Our results show that
the impact of ICT is negative in the majority of industries. Positive coefficients are never statistically significant.
The largest negative effect is found in electrical and optical equipment (30t33), where a 1% increase in ICT cap-
ital intensity reduces the labor share by approximately 0.3%. At the country level, the effect of ICT/VA is only
significant in two countries, Germany and Austria. Interestingly, these two countries are positioned at the two
extreme points of the distribution, with Germany displaying the largest negative effect and Austria the largest
positive effect. These results show that ICT capital intensity is a driver of labor share dynamics between indus-
tries, but it only marginally affects differences across countries. This strongly posits in favour of the fact that the
decline in the labor share is driven by changes in technological conditions of production and less by changes in the
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Figure 3: Long-run coefficient estimates of TFP, by industry and country (baseline estimates)
(A) (B)
Note: Darker bars denote that long-run coefficients are statistically significant.
institutional settings governing the functioning of product and factor markets.
Figure 3 shows the long-run coefficient estimates for TFP, at the industry and country level. The general im-
pact of technology is negative and statistically significant in all industries with a particularly large coefficient in
the network industries (E). The impact of TFP is always negative and significant in most countries; there is quite
a lot of variation in the size of the effect, which ranges between -0.35 (Netherlands) and -0.824 (Spain).
Overall, these results give partial support to previous work by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2014), who claim that industry variations in labor shares are more important than country
variations. Consistent with this claim, our analysis shows that the impact of ICT is a main driver of industry
trends, but not of country variations. However, other technological factors, embedded in TFP, have a pervasive
effect both at the industry and country level and this is hard to reconcile with the assumption that only industry
variations matter.
III.3 Predicting the labor share decline
In this section we answer the question of how well our model can predict the long-run changes in the labor share,
using the estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. We disentangle the observed rate of change in the
labor share into predicted and residual effects using a simplified shift-and-share decomposition model, which is
broadly consistent with our theoretical framework in Section II. Assuming discrete time for simplicity of notation,
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the rate of change in the labor share at country level can be written as (country subscript j omitted):
∆SLt
SLt
=
n∑
i=1
∆̂SLit
SLit
θ¯i︸ ︷︷ ︸
predicted effect
+
n∑
i=1
S¯Li
∆θit
θit︸ ︷︷ ︸
residual effect
(12)
where ∆ is the first-year difference operator, and the bar denotes the value of the variable at the beginning of the
sample year. n is the number of industries in each country. θi is the industry share of GDP whereas S
L
i is the
labor share at the level of individual sector. The total change in industry labor share predicted by our model is
computed as:
∆̂SLit
SLit
=
∑
p
γˆpi
∆xpit
xpit
.
xp are the regressors used in the labor share equation. In the baseline estimation, the set xp includes TFP , ICT
capital-value added ratio, and non-ICT capital-value added. In the regression extended to include knowledge capi-
tal, xp also includes the ratio between the R&D stock and value added.
In Table 3, the first column reports the cumulative change in labor share for our sample of countries and the
aggregate. Average values are computed as weighted means of country-specific figures, where we use as weight
the share of each country in terms of relative GDP obtained using industry PPP for value added (Inklaar and
Timmer, 2008).
In the overall sample, the labor share declined by 11.1% cumulatively since the early 1970s (col. A). Our base-
line empirical model would predict a fall in labor share by 14.9% (col. B), somewhat over-fitting the observed
change. This would imply a positive (residual) (col. C). Our model overstates the decline in nine countries, but
in many cases the residuals are very small. A similar pattern of results emerges for the regression extended to in-
clude knowledge capital (col. D). However, the residual component tends to be much larger, suggesting that R&D
may not be fully capturing knowledge inputs. This leads to our next analysis which considers a broader definition
of intangible assets.
IV Labor share and heterogeneous capital: new intangible assets
In recent years, researchers have paid a great deal of attention to the changing composition of capital which, in
the knowledge-based economy, is increasingly based on intangible assets. The seminal papers in this stream of
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Table 3: Explained LS variation in the long run
Observed Baseline model Extended model with R&D
cumulative (col. 3, Table 2) (col. 4, Table 2)
change in LS (predicted) (residual) (predicted) (residual)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
AT -0.269 -0.173 -0.096 . .
AU -0.186 -0.128 -0.058 -0.157 -0.029
BE -0.074 -0.121 0.048 . .
CZ -0.020 -0.029 0.009 . .
DE -0.098 -0.139 0.041 -0.090 -0.008
DK -0.119 -0.033 -0.087 -0.263 0.143
ES -0.102 -0.221 0.119 -0.822 0.720
FI -0.236 -0.249 0.013 -0.387 0.151
FR -0.021 0.078 -0.099 -0.225 0.205
HU -0.079 -0.209 0.130 . .
IE -0.168 -0.230 0.062 0.043 -0.210
IT -0.124 -0.217 0.092 -0.612 0.488
JP -0.086 -0.288 0.202 -0.249 0.163
NL -0.212 -0.210 -0.002 -0.236 0.024
SE -0.085 0.105 -0.190 -0.204 0.119
UK 0.099 -0.123 0.222 0.202 -0.103
US -0.105 -0.170 0.065 -0.060 -0.045
TOTAL -0.111 -0.149 0.038 -0.170 0.059
literature (Corrado et al., 2005 and Corrado et al., 2009, CHS hereinafter) identify three main categories of in-
tangible assets: computerised information, innovative property and economic competencies. Computerised infor-
mation is not treated separately in our analysis as it largely comprises computer software, and so is part of our
measure of ICT capital. Innovative property refers to the innovative activity built on a scientific base of knowl-
edge as measured not only by conventional R&D statistics but also by innovation and new products and processes
more broadly defined, including new architectural and engineering design, mineral exploration and new product
development costs in the financial industry. Therefore, this is a much wider definition compared to the knowledge
capital we used in the previous section. Economic competencies include spending on strategic planning, worker
training and investments to develop new markets or extend existing ones such as spending on advertising and
brand development.
Since most intangible investments are not included in standard national accounts,8 adding these assets to the
analysis of the labor share requires adjustments to both nominal and real value added. Intangible assets involve
both purchased assets (such as new architectural and engineering designs, market research and advertising expen-
ditures) and own account (own account development of organizational structures, investments in firms’ specific
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human capital) measures. When including intangible assets, the labor share equation is re-formulated as follows:
lnS∗L,ijt = α0ij + α1ij lnA
∗
ijt + α2 ln k˜
∗
ijt + α3 ln
˜kint
∗
ijt + ijt (13)
where kint denotes intangible assets and the star superscript on the variables (∗) denotes that these have been
constructed using adjusted value added, whilst the tilde continues to indicate that the variable is expressed as a
ratio to value added. Purchased intangibles were previously classified to intermediate expenditures and so value
added needs to rise to reflect the reclassification to investment goods. Own account development of intangible
assets within firms means that a component of output was previously missing and therefore value added is also
affected. The calculations required to undertake the adjustments, as well as those to capitalise intangibles and
adjust the rates of return on capital are given in Niebel et al. (2016). Note in our main database, EU KLEMS,
software, mineral exploration and artistic originals are already included in the estimates and so they are not part
of intangible capital (kint). In the empirical analysis we further divide intangible assets into innovative property
(kinn) and economic competencies (kecom) to test the hypothesis that different types of intangible affect the la-
bor shares in different ways. As discussed above, innovative property has impacts on the extent of competition
firms face, as well as being intensive in the use of skilled labor. As before, we expect this to be positively related
to the labor share. Economic competencies, on the other hand, are those assets most closely associated with the
adoption of new technologies that require new forms of organisation, new product development and retraining of
workers. As these are likely to be complementary with both ICT capital and technology more generally measured
(as proxied by TFP) we expect them to have a negative impact on the labor share.
IV.1 Econometric strategy
Estimates of intangible assets at the industry level for EU countries are taken from Niebel et al. (2016). These
data span from 1995 to 2007 - Appendix Tables A4 and A5 present summary statistics. The shorter time di-
mension in this section, compared to the data used in Section III, prevents the use of dynamic panel techniques.
Therefore, in this section we adopt a Fixed Effect (FE) estimator to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity and
first order serial correlation (Prais and Winsten, 1954). We also distinguish between temporary productivity
shocks and long-run impacts of technology by decomposing TFP into a trend and a cyclical component, using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The trend component is consistent with the long-run impact of exogenous techni-
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cal change, estimated in Section III. TFP is a production function residual, which captures unmeasured cyclical
factor utilization and changes in production efficiency, as well as technological changes. If the labor share is anti-
cyclical because of labor market rigidities and labor hoarding (Krueger, 1999, Vecchi, 2000, Hansen and Prescott,
2005) part of what has been described as a negative impact of technology could be the result of short-term cycli-
cal productivity movements.
Results based on a FE model are also likely to be affected by reverse causality. In fact, firms may decide to
invest relatively more in one type of asset after achieving certain levels of labor cost shares. In this case, causality
would run from the labor share to capital-output ratios. In the first part of the paper the long-run effects are es-
timated with the use of the dynamic specification and adjusting for cross sectional dependence, as outlined above.
In this section, we need to implement an identification strategy in an attempt to minimise endogeneity bias. Our
identification strategy rests on the assumption that the firm’s decision to invest in a specific type of capital asset
depends on incentives to purchase capital assets internally, compared to acquiring the corresponding capital ser-
vices externally. In both cases, the firm’s decision is likely to be determined by the regulatory setting underlying
the functioning of the input markets. For instance, in the early uptake of ICT in the mid-1990s, firms’ investment
in ICT was largely determined by the liberalisation of telecommunications services in the US (Marsh et al., 2017).
On this basis, we instrument ICT capital using time-varying indicators reflecting the extent of telecom service
regulation in force at home and abroad.We constructed two sets of indicators, one reflecting regulations within
the country and the other based on regulations abroad. Only the latter proved to be valid instruments based on
standard tests. In a similar way, to predict variation in intangible investments, we look at the regulation, which
implicitly affects the cost of these investments, compared to the purchases of the corresponding service on the
market. For this reason, we instrument innovative intangibles with the regulation of architect and engineering
professional services (which is a close substitute for internal R&D). For economic competencies, we consider the
regulation of legal and accounting professional services. Data on service regulation come from OECD Sector Reg-
ulation Indicators (see Koske et al., 2015).
Since these indicators are country specific (and time varying), to gauge the incidence of the regulation at
the industry level, we multiply the regulation indicator with the intensity of use of the respective service in each
sector. The latter is defined as the share of intermediate service purchases over total intermediates expenditure
(taken at benchmark year 2000). Inter-industry intermediates transactions come from the WIOD database.9
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Table 4: The impact of intangible assets on labor share, 1995-2007 (FE-OLS estimates)
Total LS
Low/inter-
mediate
skilled LS
High-skill LS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP - trend -0.209*** -0.185*** -0.271*** 0.316***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.049)
TFP - cycle -0.578*** -0.536*** -0.509*** -0.306***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.057)
Non-ICT capital/Value added 0.000 -0.003 0.065** 0.056*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033)
ICT capital/Value added -0.0125*** -0.0132*** -0.071*** 0.166***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Intangibles /Value added -0.034***
(0.012)
Innovative properties/Value added 0.064*** 0.093*** -0.023
(0.018) (0.021) (0.031)
Economic Competencies /Value added -0.046*** -0.072*** 0.095***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031)
Groups 300 300 300 300
Observations 4120 4120 4120 4120
R-squared 0.902 0.900 0.982 0.912
Notes: Dependent variable is the total labor share over value added. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10,
5 and 1% respectively.
IV.2 New intangible assets and the labor share: Results
Table 4 shows the results based on the estimation of equation (13), presenting fixed effects estimates of the im-
pact of total intangibles (column 1) and then separating the two components, innovative properties and economic
competencies (column 2). The impact of TFP turns out to be negative and statistically significant, while the co-
efficient of non-ICT capital over value added never achieves standard levels of statistical significance, in line with
estimates in Table 2. ICT capital contributes significantly to the decline of the labor share. Similarly, intangible
assets show an overall negative impact on the labor share, but with an elasticity which is approximately twice as
large as that of ICT capital, testifying to the importance of this latest wave of innovative assets in explaining the
labor share.
When we distinguish between innovative properties and economic competencies (column 2) we find that the
overall negative impact of intangibles is due to the economic competencies component, as expected. The result for
innovative properties mirrors our earlier estimates on the impact of knowledge capital, shown in Table 2, as they
positively affect the labor share.
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In the last two columns we present estimates of equation (13) for the two groups of workers, low/medium
skilled (column 3) and highly skilled (column 4). Results for the medium and low skilled workers are mostly in
line with those for the overall sample: negative and significant impact of TFP, ICT capital and economic compe-
tencies. Overall, this suggests that new technologies are playing an important role in driving the decline of the
labor share of the low skilled. However, we also find that innovative properties contribute to an increase in their
labor share. This suggests that firms investing in innovations create opportunities for improving conditions of a
wider group of workers. This result is consistent with the analysis in Aghion et al. (2017), where low-skilled work-
ers employed in high-tech UK companies enjoy a higher wage premium compared not only to other low-skilled
workers but also to the highly skilled. Our analysis implies that this effect is not confined to the UK but it is
likely to feature in other OECD countries.
Table 5: The impact of intangible assets on labor share, 1995-2007 (IV-2SLS estimates)
IV-2SLS
Total LS
Low/inter-
mediate
Skilled LS
skilled LS
TFP - trend -0.363*** -0.465*** 0.046
(0.098) (0.134) (0.183)
TFP - cycle -0.684*** -0.723*** -0.473**
(0.103) (0.140) (0.192)
Non-ICT capital/Value added 0.0280 0.1016* 0.120**
(0.035) (0.053) (0.051)
ICT capital/Value added 0.014 -0.060*** 0.219***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.023)
Intangibles/VA
Innovative properties/Value added 0.045 0.236 -0.589***
(0.119) (0.154) (0.216)
Economic competencies/Value added -0.318*** -0.532*** 0.198
(0.087) (0.121) (0.173)
Groups 300 300 300
Observations 3580 3580 3580
Hansen J test 0.489 0.405 0.404
(p-value) [0.484] [0.525] [0.525]
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 54.9 49.6 54.9
(p-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Dependent variable is the total labor share over value added. Standard errors robust to heteroskedastictity and auto-correlation
in parentheses. Instruments used: foreign regulation of telecom services, legal and accounting services, architect and engineering services.
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Results for the highly skilled interestingly show a different pattern of effects. Technical change complements
22
Table 6: Explained LS variation in the short term
(A) (B) (C=A × B)
Observed
variation in LS
Predicted impact
Explained
variation
(cumulative
change)
(within effect)
TFP - trend 0.149 -0.185 -0.028
TFP - cycle 0.008 -0.536 -0.004
Non-ICT capital /Value added -0.104 0.000 0.000
ICT capital /Value added 1.022 -0.013 -0.013
Innovation/Value added 0.211 0.064 0.014
Econ. competencies/Value added 0.332 -0.046 -0.015
TOTAL - - -0.046
Observed LS - - -0.067
Total explained (%) - - 68.7
Unexplained residual (% ) - - 31.3
Notes: Column A reports the cumulative change of the variables. Column B reports the coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables
from col. 2, Table 4. Column C reports explained variation in LS due to each factor.
this group of workers, as suggested by the positive coefficient found for TFP, ICT capital and economic compe-
tences. However, we do not find any effect of innovative properties on the labour share of the highly skilled. It is
possible that, our skills measure, which only relies on education, does not fully capture workers’ abilities (Cheva-
lier and Lindley, 2009).
Table 5 presents the estimates using instrumental variables, as discussed above. For the total sample (column
1), results are broadly in line with those using FE, except that the ICT capital coefficient is positive, although
not statistically significant. Consistent with the earlier estimates, economic competencies have a negative impact
on the labor share. Similarly, coefficient estimates for low/intermediate skilled labor are broadly consistent with
the results in Table 4, if we consider the direction of the effect. In fact, we find that ICT and economic compe-
tencies decrease the labour share of the low/intermediate skilled workers, while they increase the labour share of
the highly skilled. Admittedly, in some cases, the size of the coefficient estimates is much inflated compared to the
FE results. For example, the impact of economic competencies on the low and intermediate skilled workers jumps
from -0.072 (Table 4, col. 3) to -0.532 (Table 5, col. 3). A similar reasoning applies to the coefficient of innova-
tive activities for the highly skilled workers. These inflated coefficients could be the outcome of the instrumental
variable strategy we implement. Although the performance of the tests at the bottom of Table 5 supports the
validity of our instruments, the inflation of the coefficient estimates suggests that either the endogeneity issue is
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not fully addressed and/or there is heterogeneity in the industries’ response to investments in intangible assets.
In this case, our instrumental variables may pick-up the effect of one atypical group of industries (local average
partial effect) rather than the average partial effect in the population (Murray, 2010).
The negative effect of innovative properties assets on the labor share of the high-skilled may be explained with
the fact that these investments lead to introducing new technologies that are substituting for ‘abstract’ skills, as
documented in vom Lehn (2018). Another possibility is that the creative destruction process induced by large
R&D investments from the mid-1990s increased the obsolescence of the skills mostly used in high value-added pro-
ductive tasks. Alternatively, given that R&D expenses mainly consist of researchers’ wages, the negative impact of
innovative activities on the high-skill labor share might indicate that companies spending more on R&D workers
seek to save on labor costs for similarly skilled groups of workers, operating outside the R&D department. More-
over, following Aghion et al. (2017), the pay of the high skilled may grow more slowly than for the low skilled as
a result of innovative investments, and this may lead to a fall in the labor share of the former workers as long as
innovative investments affect the employment prospects of both categories similarly. However, most of these ex-
planations are likely to be short-run temporary effects. Long-run estimates may better capture the overall (net)
effect of R&D (i.e., long-run gains net of the short-term crowding out effects). In this section the time period
is too short to identify the long run impacts of innovative property investments. As a further robustness check,
Appendix Table A.7 presents results based on a standard GMM regression, where we use lagged values of the en-
dogenous variables as instruments (maximum of two lags). Here, there are fewer surprises as results confirm the
overall story and the size of the effect of intangible assets are consistent with those presented in Table 4.
Finally, we examine the predictive capacity of our empirical results and show which proportion of the observed
variation in the LS can be explained by our estimates. Here we more simply quantify the variation in the LS ex-
plained by the static estimates for the period from 1995 to 2007, based on the results from column 2 of Table 4.
The results in Table 6 show that over two thirds of the variation in the labor share is explained by our specifica-
tion.
V Conclusions
This study provides a novel contribution to the debate on the causes of the decline of the labor share, by focusing
on the different types of capital assets used by firms. Previous analyses did not explore the possibility that capital
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and labor can be substitutes or complements depending on the nature of capital. Overall, we find that both ICT
capital assets and economic competencies decreases the labor share (substitution effect), while innovative capi-
tal, measured using a variety of proxies, is characterised by a complementary relationship. Results are consistent
across two datasets which vary by time period and types of assets and different model specifications and estima-
tion methods. In most specifications, we also find that technological progress, proxied by TFP, contributes to the
decline in the labor share, a result that we share with earlier contributions.
The analysis in this paper also highlights the fact that the substitution/complementary effects not only de-
pend on the type of capital but also depend on the type of labor. We find that the highly educated are particu-
larly sheltered from the negative impact of technology, and they are mainly complements, rather than substitutes,
for the different types of capital assets, with the possible exception of innovative capital. Results for the low and
intermediate skilled, on the other hand, are negatively impacted by exogenous technology, as captured by TFP,
ICT capital and intangible assets capturing economic competencies. In contrast, intangible capital capturing inno-
vative activities appears to promote the increase in the labor share of this group of workers, suggesting a comple-
mentary relationship.
Our results are important as they shed light on the discussion on the size of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labour. Focusing on the elasticity of substitution between a single labour and a single capital
input is a very limited way of looking at modern production, characterised by increasing capital and labour het-
erogeneity. In this context, measuring the different types of capital becomes crucial. Recent debate on the nature
of intangibles has identified some problematic issues. For example, in the case of intellectual properties, globalisa-
tion leads to a divergence between ownership and use across national borders. Current intangibles datasets do not
account for these aspects, as they are generally based on aggregate data. There is an urgent need for statistical
offices to develop better measures of intangible assets, building up from firm level data.
Finally, this paper links with recent literature questioning what is captured by profits when they are calcu-
lated as a residual between output and current expenditures. As intangible assets are not generally measured in
official datasets, it is difficult to disentangle whether increases in profits are due to firms’ returns on their intangi-
ble investments or above normal profits due to market concentration. The superstar firm literature emphasises
that markets have become less competitive due to the nature of the recent digital technology revolution. The
same technological developments, however, have led to increased investment in intangible capital as complemen-
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tary inputs. In turn, investment in intangible assets, such as brand development, might reinforce any trend to-
wards concentration. Disentangling these influences is an important area for future research.
Notes
1Examples using the growth accounting approach are Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000),
Timmer et al. (2010), and using econometric estimation are O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) and Venturini (2009).
Recent work highlighting the increasing role of intangible capital in explaining productivity growth in ad-
vanced economies includes Corrado et al. (2017); Niebel et al. (2016) and in driving investment demand (Alesina
et al., 2005; Cette et al., 2017).
2This formulation exploits the assumption of constant returns to scale at the economy wide level (θI =
1− θN ).
3Austria (AT); Australia (AUS); Belgium (BE); Czech Republic (CZ); Denmark (DK); France (FR); Fin-
land (FI); Germany (DE); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Italy (IT); Japan (JP); Netherlands (NL); Spain (ES);
Sweden (SE); United Kingdom (UK); United States (US).
4As a relevant special case, when  = 0, aggregate output is combined as a Cobb-Douglas technology
and the between-effect vanishes.
5In a more general CES specification, technical change would have neutral and factor specific components.
It implies that the impact estimated for technical progress from equation (9) would be the product of cap-
ital augmenting and Hicks neutral technical progress. This interpretation for α1 looks plausible as estimates
of TFP from EU KLEMS are based on a translog production function assuming Hicks neutral technical change.
6Following Bassanini and Manfredi (2012), we exclude Agriculture, Mining, Refining and Petroleum and
Real estate activities as well as the non-market service sectors Public Administration, Education and Health.
The exclusions are motivated by weak output measures (real estate output is mostly imputed rents and in
26
some countries public services are measured by inputs), high degree of regulation (Agriculture) and volatil-
ity of output (Mining, Petroleum Refining)
7ICT capital includes computer hardware, communications equipment and software. Non-ICT capital in-
cludes other plant and equipment, transport equipment, structures and other assets that were part of the
national accounts at that time. It does not include Research and Development capital which was added to
the national accounts at a later date. A general overview on this dataset can be found in O’Mahony and Tim-
mer (2009).
8Most of these assets lie outside the current System of National Accounts (SNA) boundaries for capital
assets. Software, mineral exploration and the artistic originals part of design have been in the national ac-
counts for some time following the SNA1993 guidelines and scientific R&D expenditures have been added,
following the SNA2008 revisions. The categories included in national accounts currently represent less than
one third of all intangibles according to the CHS definition in the US and in European countries. In addi-
tion to constructing nominal investment series, the research had to decide on appropriate deflators to con-
vert to volume measures and on the form and rates of depreciation to capitalise these assets. GDP defla-
tors were generally employed due to lack of information on asset-specific deflators. Studies varied on the pre-
cise depreciation rates but in all estimates, the rates were much higher than is generally assumed for tan-
gible capital.
9World Input-output database, available at www.wiod.org.
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Appendix Tables 
 
TABLE A.1. -  SUMMARY STATISTICS AT COUNTRY LEVEL, 1970-2007 
 
 Labor Share Non-ICT Capital/ 
Value added 
ICT Capital/ 
Value added 
TFP R&D Capital/ 
Value added 
Austria 0.70 0.70 0.04 0.81 0.17 
Australia 0.72 0.55 0.04 0.77 0.10 
Belgium 0.67 0.57 0.03 1.29 0.19 
Czech Rep. 0.58 0.57 0.07 0.71 0.08 
Germany 0.75 0.40 0.03 0.99 0.18 
Denmark 0.73 0.52 0.04 1.06 0.14 
Spain 0.65 0.40 0.03 0.95 0.05 
Finland 0.71 0.51 0.03 1.02 0.12 
France 0.71 0.39 0.04 1.05 0.20 
Hungary 0.67 0.47 0.06 0.72 0.08 
Ireland 0.64 0.64 0.03 1.18 0.05 
Italy 0.72 0.53 0.03 1.00 0.07 
Japan 0.64 0.72 0.05 0.65 0.28 
Netherlands 0.72 0.59 0.04 1.00 0.20 
Sweden 0.81 0.50 0.09 1.08 0.25 
UK 0.73 0.39 0.03 1.07 0.14 
US 0.68 0.35 0.04 1.00 0.26 
TOTAL 0.70 0.51 0.04 0.97 0.15 
  
TABLE A.2. - SUMMARY STATISTICS AT INDUSTRY LEVEL, 1970-2007 
 Labor share Non- ICT capital/ 
Value added 
ICT capital/ 
Value added 
R&D capital/ 
Value added 
TFP 
Food 0.62 0.55 0.02 0.06 0.90 
Textiles 0.81 0.61 0.02 0.05 0.58 
Wood 0.76 0.49 0.02 0.02 0.91 
Paper 0.68 0.48 0.05 0.03 0.82 
Chemicals 0.53 0.63 0.02 0.53 1.46 
Rubber 0.71 0.36 0.01 0.11 2.08 
Non-met. min. 0.68 0.48 0.02 0.08 1.42 
Basic metals 0.70 0.50 0.02 0.07 0.90 
Machinery, nec 0.75 0.26 0.02 0.21 0.92 
Electr. Eq. 0.73 0.46 0.06 0.68 0.88 
Transp. Eq. 0.77 0.77 0.06 0.41 0.40 
Mauf., nec 0.88 0.25 0.02 0.05 1.28 
Transport  0.73 0.54 0.05 0.01 0.73 
Post, telecom 0.55 0.40 0.11 0.05 1.11 
Business serv. 0.76 0.40 0.10 0.08 0.62 
Ulities 0.37 1.86 0.05 0.04 0.53 
Construction 0.82 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.96 
Wholesale, retail 0.75 0.26 0.03 0.02 1.10 
Hotels 0.86 0.53 0.03 . 0.65 
Fin. Interm. 0.59 0.29 0.06 0.02 1.16 
Total average 0.70 0.51 0.04 0.15 0.97 
 
 
 
	 	
TABLE A.3. - CAPITAL-LABOR SUBSTITUTIONS AND TECHNOLOGY IMPACT ON LABOR SHARES 
LONG-RUN COEFFICIENTS – ARDL(2,2,2) 
Explanatory variables Homogeneous  
coefficients 
Heterogeneous  
Coefficients AMG 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) -0.175*** 
(0.000) 
-0.317*** 
(0.000) 
-0.387*** 
(0.000) 
Total capital/ value added -0.002 
(0.973) 
-0.047 
(0.118) 
 
Non-ICT capital/value added  -0.058 
(0.302) 
ICT capital/ value added   -0.022*** 
(0.003) 
    
ECM -0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.641*** 
(0.000) 
-0.664*** 
(0.000) 
    
Obs 8,280 8,280 7,580 
Groups 340 340 340 
Notes: Dependent variable is the labor share over value added. p-values in brackets (obtained 
with delta method).  Columns (1) reports results for an ECM model with homogeneous 
parameters. Columns (2) and (3) are augmented mean group 
 
  
TABLE A.4. - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 1995-2007 DATASET- BY COUNTRY 
Country AT BE CZ DE DK ES FI FR 
Labor share 0.576 0.613 0.545 0.679 0.651 0.601 0.600 0.635 
TFP 1.171 1.054 1.125 1.094 0.992 0.971 1.164 1.146 
Non-ICT capital/ VA 0.026 0.032 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.056 0.006 
ICT capital/VA 0.095 0.082 0.006 0.005 0.026 0.024 0.105 0.009 
Intangibles capital/VA 0.268 0.300 0.204 0.316 0.270 0.166 0.311 0.310 
Innovative properties/VA 0.181 0.185 0.128 0.227 0.175 0.094 0.204 0.202 
Economic comp./VA  0.067 0.092 0.058 0.076 0.085 0.054 0.086 0.084 
 HU IE IT JP NL SE UK US 
Labor share 0.594 0.576 0.644 0.573 0.621 0.616 0.666 0.591 
TFP 1.334 1.106 1.007 1.010 1.091 1.139 1.062 1.077 
Non-ICT capital/ VA 0.001 0.147 0.006 <0.001 0.027 0.004 0.008 0.001 
ICT capital/VA 0.001 0.413 0.011 <0.001 0.069 0.006 0.022 0.002 
Intangibles capital/VA 0.203 0.151 0.187 0.312 0.276 0.370 0.281 0.343 
Innovative properties/VA 0.086 0.078 0.125 0.266 0.155 0.251 0.125 0.213 
Economic comp./VA  0.093 0.062 0.053 0.046 0.097 0.091 0.141 0.100 
 
  
TABLE A.5. - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 1995-2007 DATASET - BY INDUSTRY 
Industry 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 24 25 26 27t28 29 30t33 
Labor share 0.555 0.744 0.694 0.590 0.379 0.602 0.588 0.655 0.657 0.576 
TFP 1.001 1.083 1.117 1.092 1.074 1.155 1.078 1.051 1.099 1.451 
Non-ICT capital/ VA 0.009 0.040 0.068 0.012 0.010 0.042 0.031 0.017 0.028 0.009 
ICT capital/VA 0.020 0.086 0.196 0.038 0.022 0.077 0.090 0.028 0.036 0.017 
Intangibles capital/VA 0.232 0.196 0.142 0.178 0.868 0.378 0.263 0.199 0.352 0.522 
Innovative properties/VA 0.126 0.092 0.062 0.080 0.747 0.286 0.183 0.119 0.248 0.414 
Economic comp./VA  0.091 0.102 0.074 0.085 0.076 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.080 0.074 
 34t35 36t37 60t63 64 71t74 E F G H J 
Labor share 0.626 0.747 0.656 0.451 0.674 0.309 0.771 0.666 0.771 0.516 
TFP 1.198 1.072 1.020 1.302 0.957 1.083 0.972 1.095 0.952 1.088 
Non-ICT capital/VA 0.036 0.056 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.017 0.004 
ICT capital/VA 0.146 0.147 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.068 0.018 0.007 0.039 0.011 
Intangibles capital/VA 0.394 0.262 0.104 0.143 0.319 0.112 0.134 0.156 0.126 0.252 
Innovative properties/VA 0.295 0.155 0.031 0.077 0.154 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.036 0.107 
Economic comp. /VA 0.074 0.095 0.065 0.046 0.121 0.058 0.072 0.092 0.080 0.121 
 
 
 
TABLE A.6  
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION. FIRST STAGE 
 Total Labour Share  Low & Interm. Skilled Labour Share  High-Skilled Labour Share 
 ICT/VA Innov. 
Prop./ 
VA 
Economic 
comp. / 
VA 
ICT/VA Innov.  
Prop./ 
VA 
Economic 
comp./ 
VA 
ICT/VA Innov.  
Prop./ 
VA 
Economic 
comp./ 
VA 
Foreign telecom services 
regulation, LN (t-1) 
-0.447*** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.096*** 
(0.010) 
-0.364*** 
(0.023) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.101*** 
(0.012) 
-0.447*** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.096*** 
(0.010) 
Foreign legal and accounting 
services regulation, LN (t-1) 
-0.382*** 
(0.111) 
0.097** 
(0.049) 
0.352*** 
(0.057) 
-0.720*** 
(0.075) 
0.071** 
(0.034) 
0.186*** 
(0.035) 
-0.382*** 
(0.110) 
0.097** 
(0.050) 
0.352*** 
(0.057) 
Foreign architect and 
engineering services 
regulation, LN (t-1) 
0.065* 
(0.035) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
0.064** 
(0.031) 
-0.105*** 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.065* 
(0.035) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
Total professional services 
regulation (weighted mean), 
LN (t-1) 
-0.990*** 
(0.155) 
-0.042 
(0.062) 
-0.323*** 
(0.076) 
-1.137*** 
(0.111) 
0.019 
(0.048) 
-0.052 
(0.056) 
-0.990*** 
(0.155) 
-0.042 
(0.062) 
-0.322** 
(0.077) 
          
R2          
OBS 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 
Tests of excluded IV          
F(6, 3271), P value <0.001 
 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Sanderson-Winmejer 
F(4, 3271), P value 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Notes. *Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets.  
  
TABLE A.7 
GMM ESTIMATION (HANSEN 1982) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total LS High-skilled 
LS  
Low/inter- 
mediate 
skilled LS 
TFP - trend -0.176*** 0.562*** -0.324*** 
 (0.049) (0.095) (0.060) 
TFP - cycle -0.480*** -0.039 -0.550*** 
 (0.043) (0.087) (0.053) 
Non-ICT capital/Value added 0.013 0.170*** 0.060 
 (0.028) (0.056) (0.042) 
ICT capital/Value added 0.004 0.162*** -0.069** 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.029) 
Innovative properties/Value added 0.037 0.017 0.025 
 (0.03) (0.056) (0.038) 
Economic competencies/Value added -0.062** 0.129** -0.085** 
 (0.032) (0.065) (0.039) 
    
Groups 320 320 320 
Observations 3,480 3,480 3,480 
R-squared 0.1813 0.2645 0.2569 
Hansen J test 0.048 0.335 0.028 
(p-value) [0.827] [0.563] [0.867] 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 74.393 74.393 74.393 
(p-value) [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Notes. *Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets. 
ICT capital, innovative properties and economic competencies have been instrumented with their lagged values at time (t-1) and (t-2) 
 
